Abstract-The general threshold broadcast encryption is not suitable for the networks with the constraints of computation and energy. In this paper, two constructions of the proper threshold broadcast encryption to these networks are proposed. In the proposed schemes, any user can dynamically join the system as a possible recipient, and the sender can dynamically choose the set of recipients S and the threshold value t. The new schemes achieve constant size private keys and O(n-t)-size ciphertexts. In addition, these schemes achieve full security in the standard model. Finally, we also show that they are provable security under n+1-Weak Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (n+1-wDBDHE) assumption and the static assumptions respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
Broadcast Encryption (BE) was introduced by Fiat and Naor in [1] . In a broadcast encryption scheme a broadcaster encrypts a message for some subset S of users who are listening on a broadcast channel. Any user in S can use his private keys to decrypt the broadcasts. Any user outside the privileged set should not be able to recover the message. The threshold broadcast encryption(TBE) problem is generalization of the concept of broadcast encryption. It was first introduced by Ghodosi et al. [2] . TBE has some advantages over traditional threshold encryptions. It is specified as follows:
S
(1) The trusted party is eliminated and the system can be set up by individual users independently;
(2) The broadcaster can choose the privileged set and the threshold value at the time of encryption which allows a certain dynamism in the system. Identity-Based encryption is originally proposed by Shamir [3] , which a major advantage is that it allows one to encrypt a message by using recipient's identifiers such as an email address. Now it has been an active area. The first practical identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme was proposed in 2001 by Boneh and Franklin [4] , which was provably secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in random oracle model. Then, many other kinds of identity-based encryption were proposed [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . Identitybased cryptography significantly reduces the system complexity and the cost for establishing and managing the public key authentication framework known as PKI (Public Key Infrastructure). As a result, we focus on the construction of identity-based threshold broadcast encryption (IBTHBE) in this paper. To the best of our knowledge, very few works have dealt with this problem. In [10] , Chai and Cao et al propose a scheme based on identity. But the length of the ciphertexts is n +1 and the security relies on the random oracles. Vanesa Daza et al propose another scheme [11] . However, its security is still relying on the random oracles. The recent work [12] has short ciphertexts, but the security of their scheme based on the identity (IBTBE) is also relying on the random oracles. In [13] , authors also proposed an efficient scheme in the standard model. But this scheme only achieves a weak security -selective-identity security.
As a natural extension of the efforts to improve schemes in the standard model, we propose two new efficient identity-based threshold broadcast encryption schemes in this paper. The proposed schemes are constructed in the standard model. In our schemes, the broadcaster can choose the privileged set and the threshold value at the time of encryption. In addition, under the full security model, the security of the first scheme is reduced to the n+1-Weak Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (n+1-wDBDHE) assumption and the security of the second scheme is reduced to the static assumptions. 
assumption holds if no t-time algorithm has a nonnegligible advantage  in solving the above game.
C Identity-based Threshold Broadcast Encryption (IBTBE)
More formally, a threshold broadcast encryption scheme consists of five algorithms. Setup The randomized Setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter k and outputs some public parameters params, which will be common to all the users of the system. Extract The key generation algorithm is run by each user ID i . It takes as input some public parameters params and returns a correspondence private key
Threshold Encryption The encryption algorithm takes as input a set of public keys corresponding to a set P of n receivers, a threshold t satisfying 1 t  n, and a message M. The output is a ciphertext C, which contains the description of P and t.  Full security, which means that the attacker can choose adaptively the identity he wants to attack (after having seen the parameters);  Selective-ID security, which means that the attacker must choose the identity he wants to attack at the beginning, before seeing the parameters. The Selective-ID security is thus weaker than full security.
To define the notion of chosen ciphertext secure identity-based broadcast threshold decryption scheme (IND-fullID-CCA) in the full security model, let us consider the following game between an adversary A and a challenger:
Setup The challenger runs Setup. Then challenger gives the resulting common parameter to A, and keeps master key secret. A issues the threshold parameters (n, t).
Phase 1 A issues private key extraction and decryption queries adaptively. The adversary A adaptively issues queries q 1 , , q s0 , where q i is one of the following:
On a private key extraction query upon ID i , the challenger runs Extract to generate the private key associated to ID i , then sends it to A.

On a decryption queries, the challenger runs Decryption to generate decryption shares and gives them to A.
Challenge When A decides that phase 1 is over, it submits a set of identities S * , a threshold value t and two messages (M 0 , M 1 )on which it wants to be challenged. The adversary's choice of S * is restricted to the identities that he did not request a private key for in Phase 1. The challenger runs Encrypt algorithm to obtain (Hdr * , K) =Encrypt(S * , PK, t) and returns them to A. Note, A may already learned about the private keys of at most 1 t  .
There is the natural constraint that S* contains at most 1 t  corrupted identities. b We say that if the above indistinguishability game allow no decryption oracle query, then the IBTBE scheme is only chosen plaintext(IND-fullID-CPA) secure. There have been many methods to convert an INDfullID-CPA scheme to an IND-fullID-CCA scheme. Therefore, we only focus on constructing the IND-fullID-CPA scheme in this paper. Setup To generate the system parameters, the PKG picks randomly generators in and an element
III NEW CONSTRUCTIONS (I)

A. Our Construction
Threshold Encryption To encrypt a message M for a set S = of n players, with threshold for the decryption, the idea is to set up an ( )-threshold secret sharing scheme, where . The n public keys ( ) of users implicitly define a degree polynomial. The idea is to compute the values of this polynomial in the points (This will lead to obtain the value of ).Then a sender acts as follows:
Select a random element and compute
( , )  The ciphertexts are 1 2 3 ( , , ,{ } )
Note: 
Efficiency In our scheme, the size of ciphertexts is O( n t  ) and the size of private key is constant as it consists of two group elements. This is the first efficient construction which has full security in the standard model for the identity-based threshold broadcast encryption. In addition, if the values and can be precomputed and cached, so no pairing computations are needed at the phase of Threshold Encryption. Table 1 gives the efficiency comparison between ours and the others IBTBEs. 
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By using (1), one can obtain the followings. 
Since cancels out, all the terms in this expression are known to B. Thus, B can compute the first private key 
IV NEW CONSTRUCTIONS (II)
The first construction achieves full security in the standard model. But the size of public keys is too large and the computation cost of the private key is expensive. In addition, the hardness assumption in our scheme is strong.
As a natural extension to improve the first scheme, we propose anther scheme in this section. It is based on the dual encryption technique [14] [15] [16] [17] . In addition, the security of the proposed scheme is reduced to three static (i.e. non q-based) assumptions.
A. Dual encryption technique
Recently, a new technique is applied to IBE. It is called Dual Encryption Technique. In a dual system [14, 15] , ciphertexts and keys can take on two forms: normal or semi-functional. Semi-functional ciphertexts and keys are not used in the real system, they are only used in the security proof. A normal key can decrypt normal or semi-functional ciphertexts, and a normal ciphertext can be decrypted by normal or semifunctional keys. However, when a semi-functional key is used to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext, decryption will fail. More specifically, the semi-functional components of the key and ciphertext will interact to mask the blinding factor by an additional random term. Security for dual systems is proved using a sequence of games which are shown to be indistinguishable. The first game is the real security game (with normal ciphertext and keys). In the next game, the ciphertext is semifunctional, while all the keys are normal. For an attacker that makes q key requests, games 1 through q follow. In game k, the first k keys are semi-functional while the remaining keys are normal. In game q, all the keys and the challenge ciphertext given to the attacker are semifunctional. Hence none of the given keys are useful for 
